Two Decades of Public Administration In Developing Countries

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W̌e have learned from two decades of international experience in public administration. It has been a costly learning, too—for some of the recipients as well as for the disseminators. What have we learned? The answer begins with a portrait of the state of the art as it was 21 years ago.

■ The article examines the state of the art of American public administration during the past 20 years and assesses the effects of efforts to apply derivations of that art in developing countries. It concludes that chief successes have been in trasferring administrative technologies; that there have been significant failures and inadequacies, particularly in public administration education in developing countries; and that a root problem of promoting development through improved public administration has been one of seeking developmental outcomes from system-maintenance oriented tools and concepts.

The Baseline—1955

Nineteen fifty-five: it was a recent year, but a year in a different era. Nineteen fify-five was a vintage year in a time of faith—faith in the developmental power of administrative tools devised in the West. It was a sanguine year in a time of hope—hope that public administration could lead countries toward modernization. It was a busy year in a brief age of charity—the not-unmixed charity of foreign assistance. It is a proper year on which to base a look at change. Nineteen fifty-five was part of a time of large-scale efforts to export public administration from the United States of America into some countries of Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This public administration can be described in terms of four of its major features: its *tool* orientation, its *structural* orientation, its *value* orientation, and its *context* orientation. These features stand in lieu of

a definition of the field. Twenty years ago in the United States there was no accepted definition. Some argued that public administration was an art comprised of the skills and behaviors of those who practice public management. Others said that if public administration was not a science, then it should be. In 1955 the social sciences were in a lively adolescence, and many of their concerns and findings were flowing into public administration. Defining that subject was less an issue than doing it, studying it, and exporting it—whatever *it* might be. As Dwight Waldo observed, "The assertion that public administration is or can be made a science has come to be made much less often and much less firmly. . . . Call administration *both* a science and an art, and get on with it."[1] The definitional issue never has been resolved.[2]

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Concerning Tools and the Tool Orientation of the Field

One major feature was a set of tools and a set of ideas about them. It is not incorrect to refer to these as the "technologies" of public administration.

They included certain "processes" that help support and order the substance of administration. Personnel administration is a prime example. By 1955 it was a long-established mixture of pragmatic and semi-systematic techniques. Psychology and social psychology were funnelling some of their products into this tool area. Meritocracy remained the ideal. Personnel selection and classification were the technical core; but new ideas, methods, and prescriptions about motivation and employee relations, about training and employee development, and about "management" were undermining the technical coherence of the field by enlarging its boundaries and concerns.

Budgeting and financial administration were well-developed and technique-centered. Public budgeting had been treated technically and prescriptively since the 1920s. The foundations of "performance budgeting" and "program budgeting" had been laid by Clarence Ridley, Herbert Simon, and others. Budgeting, the budgetary process, and the supporting tools of accounting were the preeminent domain of administrative technology, an array of principles and techniques crucial to rational, efficient, responsible public management. A systematic view of public budgeting as an intrinsically political process was still a decade off. Aaron Wildavsky's classic work on *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown) was not published until 1964.

Information technology and sophisticated techniques of administrative planning and scheduling were in their infancy, beginning to be absorbed into public administration out of industry and the inventions of World War II. Machine-processed punchcards had appeared in modern jurisdictions. IBM was on its meteoric rise to power and eminence. Operations research was being used in some quarters, and there was an avant-garde interest in sophisticated computational decision-making techniques. But the computer was more in the offing than on the scene. The word "computer" does not appear in Dwight Waldo's survey of *The Study of Public Administration*, published in 1955. Only in 1952 was the first general-purpose digital computer programmed to perform

routine office work, and much of the information and analysis technology that now symbolizes "progressive administration" remained to be developed.

Other technologies there were aplenty, ranging from records management and work simplification to property and supply administration. There was, as there is today, the large province of the lawyers as makers and scrutinizers of process and procedure. There were technologized program fields such as tax and revenue administration.

In 1955 we could still rather neatly distinguish betwen the key tools of public administration and the techniques, technologies, and theories of "organization." The tools were among the prime export products of American public administration. They were seen as crucial mechanisms for producing the kind of administration that would foster modernization. Thus, "the primary obstacles to development are administrative rather than economic. . . . Countries generally lack the administrative capability for implementing plans and programs. Countries share in common most of the same administrative problems and obstacles."[3] To solve those problems the imperative was ". . . the transfer of administrative techniques to improve the central machinery of national government."[4]

Beneath the massive export of tools was the thesis of "administration as a tool." Nineteen fifty-five was the twilight time of a premise rooted in the 19th century and withering—that a useful, workable, basic line can be drawn between "policy" and "administration." But in 1955 confounding problems were being encountered as foreign experts and their counterparts sought to install the tools of a tool-oriented administration as means to serve modernization. The tools and their working presupposed something about their context. And there was embedded in them an ideology, a set of assumptions about certain basic values—values that did not necessarily fit the circumstances to which they were being transferred.

Concerning Organization and the Structural Orientation of Public Administration

In 1955, as now, two important public administration questions were: "How should things be organized?" and "What are organizations like?" The questions were as compelling then as now. The answers and the thought about the answers were a melange of tradition, convention, theory-based prescription, and emulation. The study of bureaucracy was making inroads upon work-a-day

images of public organizations and "systems" of such organizations. New ideas about organizations were rampant. They tended to spill over, verbally more than otherwise, into the domains of practice. At the root of it all, an administrative organization was usually perceived or idealized as a "cooperative" arrangement of humans marked by a high degree of rationality.[5] And Max Weber's idealized conception of legal-rational bureaucracy was in 1955 orienting most thinking about public administrative organization.[6]

Four elemental factors in Weber's model— *specialization of function, hierarchical authority, operation on the basis of rules*, and *"impersonality,"* or the drawing of distinctions between roles and incumbents—were commonly seen as the pertinent features of the administrative agency or system. The inadequacies of this view were obvious to a lot of people: It largely ignored the human side of administration and the real problems of incentives. It afforded no foundation for the study of policy making and administrative politics. And it simply did not fit the realities of most of the developing countries of the world.

But shouldn't it?

This question was usually answered affirmatively. Weber's model, a utopian summation of one line of institutional evalution, was converted into a prescription. And this Weberian view short-circuited efforts to examine and understand some of the real possibilities—and equally real limitations—of public administration in developing countries.

In practice, efforts to design organizations for public administration in developing countries were largely emulatory. But the materials infused into the public administration teaching and training institutions of developing countries contained a large dose of Weber. It was not mitigated by an awareness that Weber had actually presented three different ideal types of organization, and had distinguished them in terms of the type of authority that impelled the socio-political system within which each model "existed."[7]

Ironically, the dominating eminence of Weber was eroding within the United States among the leaders of administrative thought. Organization theory was racing in several new directions. Norbert Wiener's work on cybernetics, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, had just been published. It was part of an effort that presented a "systems perspective" on organizations and their management, and reflected attempts to develop "general

systems theory." Cybernetics provided a new base for concerns with communications and control within organizations. It stimulated interests in "automation." It inseminated the word "feedback" into the lexicon of public administration. It helped blow down the old intellectual focus and boundaries of organizational thought.

The idea of administration as instrumental was waning. One of the nation's foremost scholars in the field observed in 1955 that "the whole complex of ideas associated with the term civil *service* needs to be rethought in the broadest, most imaginative terms. Our present amalgam of ideas. . .is surely inadequate to the present demands. . .We have just scratched the surface of institutional invention. . . ."[8] But the most advanced thinking and the nagging questions are not what get exported. One leads from strength and habit—the strength and habit of established convention. The legal-rational Weberian model fitted the vision of administration as tool. It solaced both donor and recipient: Tool-oriented public administration could be viewed as non-political. The utility of this myth reinforced the appeal of the Weberian view.

The Value Orientation and Education for Public Administration

Obvious matters are not very interesting, but obvious matters can be interesting implications. One of the most obvious features of U.S. public administration in 1955 was its normative quality: It was saturated with certain value orientations. On the domestic scene the insistent assertion of these values suggested their idealization as much as their realization.

The thematic value of them all was the idea of administration as *instrumental*. From this derived supportive values: *efficiency, rationality, responsibility*, and (sometimes) *effectiveness*. Along with these there was the burgeoning value of *professionalism*.

Administration was to be responsible for serving lawful aims in lawful ways. It was to be predictable in its modes and outcomes. Its very form and quality depended upon the presence of transadministrative means for setting goals, and for monitoring and enforcing the compliance of the actions with the rules. The Rule of Law was a leitmotiv. Education for administration included indoctrination in these values along with training in techniques.

The vision of an explicitly elitist administrative

class was rejected. Administration was the province of broadly knowledgeable, socially aware, distinctively intelligent professionals, performing the tasks of management within a national bureaucracy, within its major cities, and—hopefully—within its states. They were to be recruited under an egalitarian ideal (consistent with the existence of a large and mobile middle class).

This value of professionalism spawned certain issues—how to train administrators? About what should they be skilled and discerningly judgmental? Particularly outside the technique areas there were then (as now) the questions: "What is to be professed and mastered? To what professional standards should they defer?" These questions are easier to ask than answer. As a leading sociologist observed: "Perhaps the organizational executive in particular, because he must deal with so many diffuse intangibles (including the basic uncertainties of changing situations in complex environments), must always 'play it by ear' instead of submitting to codified rules or definitions of essential technical knowledge."[9]

Programmatic professionalism was a powerful political force with U.S. public administration by 1955. The value orientations of this facet of administrative professionalism extended to the specification of political goals—ostensible "technical criteria," institutionalized through training, education, research, professional association, and effective political claim-making. For program administrators in agriculture, health, education, welfare, planning, law, etc., important normative questions were answered by reference to "professional standards." While some of these were essentially ethical, many of them were, as they are today, programmatic: so many square feet of space per child, so many cases per worker, so many children per teacher, etc.

As for the generalist administrators, practitioners and pedagogues were usually insulated from knowledge of such fields as agriculture, health, education, and public works. As a result, their potential for grasping and responding to many of the most palpable administrative needs of developing countries was not so high as one might have hoped, in 1955 and the years that followed.

The pristine value orientations of American administration did not fit the immutable realities of many developing countries. The realities did not go unrecognized. But recognition often took the form of assertions that efficiency, rationality, effectiveness, responsibility, and professionalism

must be institutionalized with the public administration of developing countries, if the vision of administration in the service of development was to be fulfilled. Some implications of this view were beyond both ken and competence of the exporters of the American vision of modern public administration.

Efficiency, or at least effectiveness, and rationality are among essential properties of good public administration anywhere. It does not follow that tools and techniques developed in the United States would serve those values in other settings. (They didn't always work at home.) And the implications of the value of responsibility confounded many efforts to achieve what Ralph Braibanti has called "The Transnational Inducement of Administrative Reform."[10]

Writing of the American approach to development through administration, my colleague Jack Koteen has observed:

Early Agency programs. . ., starting in the 1950's, concentrated on the transfer of administrative techniques to improve the central machinery of national government. Thus, they reflected the then-current U.S. doctrine and experience in public administration. It was felt that chief executives need the management tools of budgeting, personnel, accounting, auditing, organization and methods analysis, and reporting. Government officials, it was reasoned, could thereby more effectively discharge their responsibilities, control their activities, and achieve a greater measure of "efficiency and economy" in the wide array of public services. . . .

A major strategy. . . was to seek comprehensive, government-wide administrative reform. . . Also important during this period was the establishment of institutes of administration that trained large numbers of cadre to engage in the vast task of modernizing public services to cope with the demands of economic development. . . .[11]

It was assumed—it has to be assumed—that proper value orientations could be inculcated into public administration through professionalism, itself to be institutionalized through training, education, and the redesign of administrative arrangements and procedures. Thus administration would become a *responsible* tool in the service of development. But the instrumental mythos of U.S. public administration was by 1955 losing much of its ascribed validity. And the normative elements of that mythos—particularly the commitment to responsibility as a basic value—were predicated upon a certain kind of socio-political context—the kind of context which is distinguished in its absence from nearly every developing country in the world.

The Contextual Orientation of U.S. Public Administration

The context of American public administration 20 years ago included complex and interactive economic, social, political, and intellectual aspects.

Economically, the role of administration was limited and the resources available were vast. The thrust of the U.S. economy of 1955 lay largely outside of government. The tasks of administration did not include the creation of wealth where there was little, nor did they encompass a deliberate and radical transformation of the economic structure.

Societally, public administration functioned in a relatively pragmatic, pluralist, dynamic context. It was not the chief source of middle-class status and employment. Its functions did include sizable social welfare efforts, but not an obligation to the rapid transformation of society itself.

Politically, American public administration functioned in a rich and complex set of political environments, marked by legislative oversight, political leadership, and popular involvement in limited and orderly competitions for share in control of government. There were deeply institutionalized arrangements for the transfer of political power. "The government" was a federalistic set of loosely linked and partially integrated domains of goal-setting, goal-protecting, and goal-pursuit. Some balancing and integration was obtained through complex combinations of myths and mechanisms. The real "systems" of action involving public administration included interest groups, legislative committees, communications media, and substantive jurisdictions. These "systems" operated within reasonably stable political frameworks, with limited competition for resources and mandates. In this milieu, administrative technologies provided *order* more than *integration*. The political context of administration was generally predictable, supportive, and incrementally expansive. One of the miracles of U.S. technical assistance in public administration is that exported tools and ideas sometimes worked as intended in political environments so profoundly different from that of their source.

As for the intellectual context, the dominant concerns of public administration were not intensely intellectual, in the broad sense of that ambitious term. There were boundaries as well as interchanges between public administration and the social sciences. The professionalistic orientation of academic efforts in public administration encouraged a focus upon problems *within* the field, more than upon problems *of* the field.

One of the latter problems was the shifting position of administration in an intellectual view of politics. John Gaus had noted in 1950 that "a theory of public administration means in our time a theory of politics too."[12] But with political science, as Waldo noted, "there is little creative interaction."[13] With the field of political theory, the presumed proprietor of issues concerning administration-and-politics, "relations of public administration have never been close or cordial."[14]

Some academics were beginning to talk of a need for the study of "political economy." This would—hopefully—provide a more comprehensive calculus for setting social goals, choosing instruments, and assessing relations between government and the economy. The idealized aid of political economy was a "net" maximization of desired goals in society.[15] Intellectually this was exciting stuff; its impact upon the concerns of public administration was not large enough to be labelled modest. The most important intellectual onslaughts against the politics-administration dichotomy were the development of the "case method" as part of the study of public administration, and the resurrection of the "group theory" approach to the study of the political process. Some public administration cases of the 1950s attested (unsystematically) the intertwining of our governmental institutions in the "real" political process. The interest-group perspective on the political process, exemplified by David Truman's work on *The Governmental Process*, more systematically portrayed mid-20th century political realities in the United States. The case method was to some extent exported.[16]

By 1955 the edges of American administrative ethnocentrism were being breached in the comparative study of politics and government. The work of Herman Finer and Carl J. Friedrich was influential. Looking across the array of Western experience and into its historical backgrounds, Finer and Friedrich delineated broad and basic issues in the relations between public administration and social, economic, and political development. Their classic studies, and the increasing encounters with immediate realities in developing countries, encouraged the rise of a subfield of public administration, "comparative administration." In 1956 the first American book on this

subject was published, *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration.*[17]

The radical differences between the U.S. administrative context and various overseas situations were substantially ignored. Some transfer of intellectual perspectives between U.S. institutions and schools and scholars in developing countries was beginning by 1955. It had little impact upon the transit of operating ideas and techniques. These were rooted in convention and impelled by faith, hope—and politics.

In 1955, as in other years of the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the international transfer of public administration could be described as big business. Hundreds of Americans were working overseas. Students from developing countries were coming abroad to study. New institutions were springing up across the world to teach the tools of public administration, to create the professionals, and to proclaim the assumptions of those whose means were administration and whose intents were modernization.

The Trend of the Decades: A Brief Note

Public administration was a major category of American technical assistance well into the 1960s. From about 1967 emphasis declined rapidly and sharply. U.S. government funding for public administration projects dropped from $18 million in 1967 to $11.4 million in 1970 and $9.8 million in 1972. Between 1955 and 1963, U.S. aid for public administration had totalled $187 million. In the early 1970s the annual rate was less than half the average for the earlier period.[18]

The shift is reflected in a comparison of the development literature of the early 1950s with such later statements as the Pearson Report submitted in September 1969 to the World Bank. The 400 pages of that report contain only passing attention to public administration.

Why this shift? Was it because the job was done? The indigenous administrative capabilities of developing countries had grown by the middle of the 1960s. Tens of thousands of individuals from those countries had been trained. Between July 1, 1952, and March 31, 1963, almost 6,000 persons were sent abroad for training under the U.S. aid program alone. The United Nations, the Ford Foundation, and the United States government had helped establish or develop some 70 public administration training institutions in developing countries.[19] A lot of changes had occurred.

One was a growing conviction that the key to development is not so much the general improvement of public administration as the fostering of indigenous economic growth through effective domestic and international policies. From the mid-1960s, the hopeful views of the 1950s, in which administrative creation and reform figured so largely, were increasingly replaced by more complex and more economically oriented problem perspectives.

The frustrating public administrative experience of the period encouraged this shift, although there were some important achievements. The most frequent successes were transfers of specialized technologies. The sheer numbers of persistence of public administration institutes and similar training, education, research, and consultation organizations suggest that this facet of administration transfer and development has had its impact. It has been a mixed impact. The commitment to broad and rapid transformations of the institutions of public administration has faded. Yet it was not entirely unsound.

It is hard to dispute the primordial premise that effective administration mechanisms *are* important to national development. It is equally hard to ignore the argument that developers must do the things they know how to do. Twenty years ago public administration was one of the things people thought they knew how to do and how to transfer. Since then our knowledge has grown enormously, and with it our sense of the limited scope and potency of some of that knowledge. Our failures and disappointments have probably taught us more than our successes. What are some of the lessons?

Lessons and Portents

First: Tool aspects of administration have transferred most readily across national and cultural boundaries—especially the budgetary and financial technologies. Some of these transfers have had significant constructive effects.

The long-established core technologies of public administration are palpable and specific in content and direct output. What to establish, how to establish it, with what probable outcomes, can be known in advance of action. And certain technologies offer obvious attractions: They promise increased order and control, plus compatibility with a wide range of policy orientations. Fiscal technologies serve the needs of people, often

among the most potent and purposive in a government, responsible for managing finances. Administrative technologies also tend toward relatively high (but admittedly varying) degrees of self-containment. Their enactment can be buffered against impact of the larger environment. Technologies are rather readily learnable. And every package of administrative technologies worthy of the label is a coherent combination of procedures, norms, and partial organizational specifications. The technical norms must be honored if the technology is to work: Their content and effect are closely linked with outputs. As a result, it is sometimes possible in a technological field of action to institutionalize arrangements and behaviors consistent with the values of rationality, effectiveness, and responsibility, even when the larger bureaucracy is not much imbued with such values.

Second: The attractiveness of technology transfer has been matched by major problems. Availability has encouraged misuse. Quite a few efforts to transfer technologies out of American public administration into the governmental apparatus of developing countries have failed, entirely or substantially, initially and sometimes permanently, through suboptimization and irrelevance. Efforts have sometimes been frustrated by formalism. Effects of intrinsically adequate tools have in instances been judged trivial in relation to needs and expectations.

Budget processes and accounting arrangements that "make financial management neat and tidy without much affecting financial policy" are not uncommon examples of suboptimization.[20] Others include elaborate "rationalizations" of formal organization, and O & M units and planning units lacking any potent linkages with goal-setting and resource-allocating centers.[21]

The precise distinction between suboptimization and perverse irrelevance is not as clear as the fact that imported technologies have too often produced the wrong results—unneeded information, superfluous proceduralism, and the frustration of intent. Particularly good—or bad—examples are found among developing country experiences with computers, management information systems, and planning tools.

Governments of countries in Africa must beware of reformists who are so obsessed with some of the modern management technologies that they are determined to foist them upon the poor countries. Premature computerization and hasty introduction of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) into the administrative systems can do more harm than good....Countries that have comprehensive development planning when their data base is very shaky and their administrative capability unable to cope have found out to their dismay that some of the new techniques are not automatically applicable....[22]

The problem of formalism was celebrated in the work of Fred W. Riggs. He explained formalistic propensities in the administration of developing countries in terms of a theory of "prismatic society."[23] Jose Abueva has illustrated and analyzed some of these tendencies toward formalism and resistance to technologies on grounds of their inconsonance with old cultural values.[24] This "culture vs. technology" view can be pushed to the level of chauvinistic absurdity (just as the "traditional vs. modern" dichotomy can be elevated into an absurd oversimplification). As an explanation of why technologies won't work, "culture" is sometimes the refuge of the very pragmatic negativist. In technological activities formalism and ambiguous bureaucratic behavior frequently can be minimized, with gains in the effectiveness and predictability of particular bureaucratic domains. But deliberate efforts toward such ends require knowledge and understanding not provided by the technologies themselves.

Technologies do not include criteria for determining whether or not to use them. Yet technologies, which are at best instruments for solving problems, have often been used as a means of *"defining"* problems. Together, these two statements explain a lot of the failures of administrative technology transfer and the limited success of many attempts to modernize public administration in developing countries.

Problems are not actually defined—they are stipulated. One of the greatest suboptimizations of the past 20 years has been the tendency to "define" rather large problems of administration and development in technological terms. A problem is a synthesis of facts (or assumed facts) and judgments. The question: "What is the problem?" can be answered by analysis and deliberation, or by action, or both. When the answer is determined by action more than by analysis, an interesting thing happens: The solution specifies the problem. The problem becomes that set of conditions which is beneficially affected by the intervention.

Problems which are "in fact" largely technical are susceptible of technological solutions. Over the years American public administration focused largely upon *intrinsic* or instrumental problems, to

be attacked through technology in the service of efficiency, effectiveness, rationality, and/or control. The ready availability and apparent utility of administrative technologies stimulated tendencies to "define" the administrative problem of developing countries in technological terms. The decisions to install technologies have not always been informed by analysis.

In or out of the U.S., there is a lot of humbug mixed in with the solid meat and bone of the recent and still exotic topics of PPB, computers, operations research, information systems, etc. If the exporting nation is represented by consumers of humbug, then the old rule applies that "when the blind lead the blind, they all shall fall in the ditch."[25]

Alas, the implications of this propensity for error are much greater for developing countries. As Caiden and Wildavsky have noted, where needs are greatest means are most limited, probabilities of error are largest, and the cost of mistakes is highest.

Third: The technology transfer efforts of the past two decades illustrate a basic feature of the public administration that has been so extensively and expensively exported to developing countries: It has aimed more at *maintenance* needs than *developmental* needs. The established technologies and traditional conventions of American public administration were best suited to the operation and incremental improvement of established arrangements, within well-institutionalized sociopolitical systems. In such systems a tool-and-technique orientation to administration makes considerable sense.

Maintenance and development do not, of course, constitute a pure dichotomy. Maintenance activities are essential in developing as well as developed countries. Revenues must be produced and allocated. Public works, health and education services, public infrastructure for agriculture, law enforcement, and dozens of other things must be provided with reasonable effectiveness and predictability. If concerns with these matters are necessary, they are also insufficient to development.

Administrative technologists and other transfer agents too often suboptimized, and *assumed* auspicious relationships between improved bureaucratic outputs and increased developmental effects. This is understandable. Ten or 20 years ago no one knew much about ways to monitor complex non-economic organizations for effect as well as output, or how to design agencies that could adjust smoothly and effectively in response to

feedback about effects, in the absence of effective external political institutions. Even today our knowledge of these aspects of administrative design is quite limited. We have developed relatively sophisticated social indicators and ways of getting them. To move from indicators to orderly auspicious changes in cause-effect relations remains a long step indeed.

In the first of the two decades past, some Western scholars came to fear the possible effects of bureaucratic modernization in countries with feeble political institutions: The bureaucrats might take command of policy making as well as execution. The emergence of "technocrats" as key elements of policy leadership in a number of developing countries suggests some basis for this concern. Yet few of the technocrats of Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, the Philippines, and other countries where they flourish have come out of conventional education and activity in public administration. And the second of the two past decades was marked by a spreading sense of the impotence of public administration—not its political dynamism. Mechanistic views of organization, process-oriented technical expertise, generalized professionalism, and purposive objectivity—these ubiquitous features, instrumentally important as they are, proved to be neither the crucial creative levers of development nor the means of political take-over.

Fourth: The conventional, inward-oriented perspective epitomized by concerns with tools and technology was embedded in training and education for public administration. More basic needs—for the analysis of development problems and of administration-environment-goal relations pertinent to their solutions—were neglected. The lesson is that of a large need for redesigning public administration training and education, as these pertain to development.

There is a lot of emulative scholasticism in public administration education in developing countries. Indigenous contexts, plus limited external support for upgrading, have conspired against creativity and the adaptation of imported curricula and ideas to better fit local circumstances.

The record in the field of training is not clear. Once one goes above the level of narrow skill and knowledge training, training effects are elusive in any case.[26] We know relatively little about the consequences of management training in our own milieu, let alone in developing countries.

Few of the 70 public administration institutes

have made their marks in research. There are exceptions, and that is precisely what they are. Some of these institutes have been described as little more than "disasters." This is both sad and ironic; the first test of their effectiveness should be survival and acceptance—if only because this is the first law of public administration everywhere. Agencies that cannot practice that law can hardly preach it well.

Just as many efforts at bureaucratic reorganization and administrative rationalization and reform have failed, some institutes failed because their aims were unattainable: the contexts were so profoundly inconsonant with their goals. In many of those settings, large strivings at administrative transformation may have been noble; they were also sometimes bizarre.

Today—after two decades of building institutes and other arrangements for public administration, education, training, research, and consultancy—business schools, industrial engineering schools, and economic development institutes are preferred instruments of education and training for the managers and designers of program and projects in developing countries. This is unfortunate. These alternative instruments are not likely to address essential features of the training and education agenda.

The issue is not one of academic jurisdiction. It is a matter of preparing persons and devising arrangements for essential tasks of developmental analysis and design. These include the analysis of potential policies and programs in terms of organizational and top-level managerial requirements and issues. Development projects, programs, and agencies are usually planned and devised on the basis of economic analysis, and/or analysis based upon programmatic technological factors. Organizational and managerial issues are ignored, or resolved by intuition or established conventions. The approach is analogous to the application of administrative technologies discussed above. So are some of the results.

The crucial need is to reduce the likelihood of error in the design and implementation of development efforts. Technological expertise will ever be limited in its capacity to contribute to this need: It can often say what won't work, or what is necessary if not sufficient to effective action. It cannot guide the selection of large goals and major means. Granted that public administration has no superior track record in dealing with such basic needs, it does have a distinctive potential for

making a vital contribution.

The agenda of public administration has enlarged beyond the instrumental orientation of 20 years ago. In principle and somewhat in practice it encompasses the analysis of relations between public organizations and their socio-political environments. It examines the limits and potentials of bureaucracy as an instrument of social change. It considers the implications of trying to act effectively under noval and relatively indeterminate conditions. *This* is the part of the agenda that needs attention and emphasis. The conventional subjects—budgeting, personnel, and other technologies—should be fitted within a framework that includes criteria and modes of analysis for making effective and discerning use of technologies.

Fifth: If the need for ability to design and implement arrangements involving technologies is greater than the need for the technologies, then that need is for what some people call *development administration*. This term—it has been around for more than a decade—attests to rising frustrations with the public administration of the West as an instrument of development.

The essence of development is not to maintain, but to create effectively. In the design approach of development administration, innovative problem analysis and "definition" logically precede the specification of solutions.[27] Through the past 20 years, problem-defining capabilities within developing countries have grown considerably, usually in specialized entities. These include some planning agencies, ministries, and departments making use of such analytical tools as sector and project analysis, and some finance ministries. A common and important imperfection of these increased capacities is their limited ability to take account of organizational and managerial factors.

The most powerful and extensively used tools are economic. "Organization" is treated as a given, or even as a factor extraneous to the analysis. In this respect these tools can be perverse. They can also be strengthened by being placed in proper context.

Doing this means, among other things, marshalling substantial amounts of knowledge about organizational design and the effects of alternative organizational arrangements. It means applying such knowledge to ubiquitous and important organizational problems—such as the miasmic realities of public enterprises in many places, and the dreary ineffectuality of many of the organizations

called cooperatives. We need to know the factors that determine if these and other organizational forms will be effective, or not effective. Many of these factors are *environmental*—not intrinsic to the organizations themselves. Thus a key concern of developmental design is the task environment. Another is the interplay of organization and environment in relation to desired goals. Even more challenging—we need mechanisms for applying that knowledge.

An excellent illustration of a developmental design strategy is found in John D. Montgomery's study of "The Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Process and Outputs."[28] The problem he addressed was not land reform, but the *effects* of alternative organizational approaches to land reform. He examined 25 cases, classified them into three categories—centralized, decentralized, and "devolved" organizational arrangements—and asked: What different effects did each of these arrangements produce—on bureaucratic power, on peasant security, on peasant political power, and on peasant income?

The findings are significant: "Devolvement of land reform operations. . .gives substance to local government. . .and the largest volume of peasant benefits. The expected result is a spiraling citizen interest, and presumably a greater commitment to the political process by which government enters into developmental activities."[29] Montgomery discovered certain trade-offs between centralization and peasant benefits, between peasant benefits and bureaucratic power, between administrative effectiveness and ease of administrative management. As he shows, alternative designs have alternative consequences. *A priori* knowledge of this fact—knowledge for design—opens up the opportunity for informed choices of means. Such choices can have profound effects.

Montgomery's inquiry epitomizes development administration. It shows how design can be rooted in analysis of the prospective effects of known alternatives, prior to the basic decisions about implementation.

Under real-world conditions of novelty and indeterminacy the design process does not end when implementation begins. It continues, in management processes that look beyond outputs to effects and accordingly adjust inputs and/or operations and/or goals.

Approaches of this kind, and the building of capacity to apply them, are prime needs, now and undoubtedly for the next 20 years. The past 20 offer us no clear assurance of their fulfillment, for these are heroic needs.

One final lesson: In two decades we have come a long way from the self-assured export and import of conventional administrative ideas and techniques. As a consequence, one-time importers and exporters have come closer together. The so-called developed countries have moved beyond systems maintenance administration into efforts to guide and manage social change. The lessons of the last decade in the United States—the lessons of the "War on Poverty" for example—demonstrate that we too have great needs for development administration—needs that somewhat parallel those of other developing countries. There is much that we can learn together, that we can truly share instead of peddle. We should therefore build the content and apply the portents of development administration, and make more sensible use of conventional public administration, as we face futures marked by blooming demands for the coordination and integration of efforts, for the adroit and effective setting and service of social goals, and for more audacious and auspicious public interventions in the terms of human existence.

Notes

1. Dwight Waldo, *The Study of Public Administration* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).
2. Martin Landau. "Political Science and Public Administration: 'Field' and the Concept of Decision Making," ch. 7 of his *Political Theory and Political Science* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), presents the definitive treatment of which is involved in the effort to define the content, or in his words, the "center" of the discipline of public administration.
3. Donald C. Stone, "Government Machinery Necessary for Development," in M. Kriesberg (ed.), *Public Administration in Developing Countries* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965) (Proceedings from a 1963 conference in Bogota), p. 53.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Waldo, *op. cit.*, p. 6
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
7. Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962).
8. Waldo, *op. cit.*
9. Talcott Parsons, "Professions," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 12 (New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1968), p. 545.
10. In J. D. Montgomery and W. J. Siffin (eds.),

Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

11. AID memorandum, January 18, 1974, "Technical Assistance in Public Administration," Jack Koteen to Joel Bernstein.

12. "Trends in the Theory of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review* Vol. 10 (1950), p. 168.

13. Waldo, *op. cit.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper, 1953), was the major American statement of the time.

16. Raol de Guzman (ed.), *Patterns in Decision-Making, Case Studies in Philippine Public Administration* (Manila: Graduate School of Public Administration, 1963).

17. W. J. Siffin (ed.), *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington, Ind.: Department of Government, Indiana University, 1956).

18. Current data are from the above-cited AID memorandum of January 18, 1974. Earlier data are from R. Braibanti, "Transnational Inducement of Administrative Reform," in J. Montgomery and W. J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 147.

19. Koteen-Bernstein memorandum cited above.

20. Personal communication from Burton D. Friedman, Public Administration Service, La Paz, Bolivia, December 13, 1974.

21. See Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, *Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries* (New York: Wiley, 1974).

22. Adebayo Adedeji, "Formulating Administrative Reform Strategies in Africa," Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries (New York: United Nations, 1973), Vol. III, *Technical Papers,* pp. 55-73.

23. Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

24. Jose Abueva, "Administrative Doctrines Diffused in Emerging States: The Filipino Response," in R. Braibanti (ed.), *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), p. 573.

25. Friedman memorandum, *op. cit.*

26. W. J. Siffin, "Factors Involved in the Evaluation of Management Training Institutions," Program of Advance Studies in Institution Building and Technical Assistance Methodology, Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities, c/o International Development Research Center, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1974.

27. For a general description, see W. J. Siffin, "Development Administration as a Strategic Perspective," in Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms (New York: United Nations, 1973), Vol. III, *Technical Papers,* pp. 152-160.

28. *Administrative Science Quarterly,* March 1972. An earlier version of this statement is found in N. Uphoff and W. Ilchman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 449-462.

29. Uphoff and Ilchman, *ibid.,* p. 458.